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Abstract—This two-part paper addresses the design of retail
electricity tariffs for distribution systems with distributed energy
resources such as solar power and storage. In particular, the
optimal design of dynamic two-part tariffs for a regulated monop-
olistic retailer is considered, where the retailer faces exogenous
wholesale electricity prices and fixed costs on the one hand and
stochastic demands with inter-temporal price dependencies on
the other. Part I presents a general framework and analysis
for revenue adequate retail tariffs with advanced notification,
dynamic prices and uniform connection charges. It is shown that
the optimal two-part tariff consists of a dynamic price that may
not match the expected wholesale price and a connection charge
that distributes uniformly among all customers the retailer’s fixed
costs and a price-volume risk premium. A sufficient condition
for the optimality of the derived two-part tariff among the class
of arbitrary ex-ante tariffs is obtained. Numerical simulations
quantify the substantial welfare gains that the optimal two-part
tariff may bring compared to the optimal linear tariff (without
connection charge). Part II focuses on the impact of two-part
tariffs on the integration of distributed energy resources.
Index Terms—Retail tariff design, connection charges, dynamic
pricing, distributed energy resources, optimal demand response.
I. INTRODUCTION
THE electric power industry is experiencing an importanttransformation driven by disruptive innovation in dis-
tributed renewable generation and energy storage systems [1].
A concern of this transformation is the impact of the inclining
adoption of said distributed energy resources (DERs) on the
financial viability of regulated distribution grid operators [2].
In particular, under the restriction to volumetric and net-
metering tariffs, the gradual decline in energy sales could
compromise the ability of grid operators to recover their
predominantly fixed operational and capital expenditures. This
could result in the need to increase retail prices further above
wholesale electricity prices, thereby amplifying the entailed
economic inefficiencies, inter-customer cross-subsidies, and
incentives for DER adoption in a vicious circle.
This two-part paper aims to shed lights on the effectiveness
of connection charges as a means to mitigate the negative
impacts of the sustained adoption of DERs. To this end,
Part I develops a framework to analyze the efficiency of
retail electricity tariffs set for a regulated retailer who serves
a heterogeneous population of residential customers under
demand and wholesale price uncertainties.
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In particular, we are interested in two practical and fairly
general ex-ante retail pricing models: a volumetric linear tariff
and a two-part tariff consisting of a volumetric linear charge
and a connection charge. Our goal in Part I is to gain insights
into the structure of the optimal revenue adequate linear and
two-part tariffs that allow us to analyze, in Part II, the effects
of integrating customer and retailer-owned DERs.
A. Related Work
There is a vast literature on efficient retail pricing of electric-
ity, the economic foundations of which reside in the classical
theory of peak-load pricing [3]—known more recently as
dynamic pricing [4]. Recent reviews of the subject along
with a brief history of its adoption by regulators and electric
utilities can be found in [5], [6]. In this context, connection
charges have been considered as a means to raise additional
revenue to recover the predominantly fixed costs of electric
utilities [3]. In the U.S., mild connection charges are prevalent
with exceptions such as California, where the large investor-
owned utilities have default volumetric residential tariffs with
virtually no connection charges1 [7].
In the last two decades, while the adoption of time-
varying prices has been particularly slow in the U.S. [4],
the advent of cheaper smart meters, small-scale renewable
energy installations, battery storage technologies and home
energy management tools has stimulated research in dynamic
pricing (see [8], [9] and references therein) as sophisticated
technologies can enable customers to react to price signals
[10]. Of particular interest is real-time pricing (RTP), a form
of dynamic pricing widely known to be a critical feature of
efficient electricity markets [11]. An overview of dynamic
pricing and a recent analysis of its limited adoption in the
U.S. are available in [11] and [4], respectively.
Economic approaches to dynamic pricing often rely on func-
tional demand models to characterize competitive equilibrium
prices when smart meters become available to customers [12]–
[14].The most relevant analysis is [14] where the socially
optimal linear and two-part retail tariffs subject to a retailer
revenue sufficiency constraint are derived. Unlike our work,
however, this analysis does not accommodate inter-temporal
demand dependencies nor the integration of DERs.
Most engineering approaches, on the other hand, focus on
analyzing demand response models in smart grids [8], [9].
These approaches often involve modeling customer behavior
1PG&E and SDG&E have no connection charge whereas SCE’s charges
$0.99/month. While these utilities have a minimum bill of $10/month or less,
it is binding on extremely few customers, and thus practically irrelevant [7].
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2[15], [16], sometimes down to the appliance level [17]–[20], by
characterizing customers’ response to certain pricing scheme.
Appliances modeled include thermostatically controlled loads
(TCL) [19], [20], electric vehicles [18], and batteries [17].
Other works focus on designing said pricing schemes to induce
a desired behavior anticipating customers’ response [21]–[26].
For example, the work in [21] considers utility-maximizing
consumers and a social-welfare-maximizing supplier that pro-
cures electricity in two steps (day-ahead and in real-time).
In a multiperiod and deterministic setting, the authors derive
the socially optimal retail prices: a time-differentiated linear
tariff. In a similar setting where only the real-time market
and a stylized TCL model are considered, the work in [26]
derives optimal day-ahead retail prices while accommodating
cost and demand uncertainty and an implicit retailer revenue
requirement2.
B. Summary of Results and Contributions
The main contribution of Part I is the explicit characteriza-
tion of the optimal revenue adequate ex-ante two-part tariff
for a stochastic demand with inter-temporal dependencies.
The results in Part I lay the foundation for analyzing the
welfare impacts of integrating DERs such as solar power
and energy storage under different retail tariffs, which we
address in Part II. Here we apply the classical Ramsey pricing
theory with extensions to accommodate the uncertainty and
inter-temporal dependencies of demand that arise with the
integration of behind-the-meter renewables and storage. While
economic literature has disregarded said extensions, engineer-
ing approaches to dynamic pricing and demand response have
ignored the revenue adequacy objective of retail tariff design,
which our work addresses explicitly. In this context, there are
no existing comparable studies in the open literature with the
exception of a preliminary work in [27]. To a large extent,
our results are an examination of emerging issues in smart
distribution systems through the lens of classical economic
results on the fundamental efficiency of two-part tariffs in
stylized economic models [3].
The main results of this paper are as follows. We consider
the design of ex-ante retail tariffs from the perspective of a
regulated retailer subject to a revenue sufficiency constraint.
The ex-ante tariffs considered here include traditional tariffs
with long lag times as well as some of the more sophisticated
tariffs that are being considered for smart distribution systems.
Examples include time-of-use tariffs, critical peak pricing,
variable peak pricing, and real-time pricing [10]. The retailer
considered in this paper is a regulated monopoly which, on one
hand, serves heterogeneous residential customers with elastic
demands. The demand model considered here is stochastic and
captures inter-temporal price dependencies. On the other hand,
the retailer interfaces with an exogenous wholesale market
with stochastic real-time prices. We describe the models in
our formulation in Section II.
Within this general setting, we characterize the structure of
optimal linear and two-part tariffs in the presence of demand
2The revenue requirement is incorporated indirectly into the formulation
through a weighted social welfare objective.
and wholesale price uncertainty in Section III. In particular,
we show that the optimal ex-ante two-part tariff consists of a
time-varying retail price that not always matches the expected
wholesale price and a connection charge that allocates uni-
formly among all customers the retailer’s fixed costs and risk-
related costs caused by the ex-ante determination of the tariff.
We further show that the optimal volumetric tariff, referred
hereafter as linear tariff, is characterized by a time-varying
price markup—relative to the optimal two-part tariff’s price—
that depends on the retailer’s fixed costs and the price elasticity
of demand.
We further compare the efficiency of the linear and two-part
tariff in Section III-C. Specifically, we present a parametric
characterization of the social welfare (SW) or total surplus
and the consumer surplus (CS) as a function of the retailer’s
fixed costs. We show that the two-part tariff achieves the same
SW regardless of the retailer’s fixed costs. For the linear tariff,
in contrast, the SW decreases as the fixed costs increase, thus
characterizing a trade-off between fixed costs and efficiency.
We also provide a sufficiency condition under which the two-
part tariff is optimal among all ex-ante nonlinear tariffs.
We demonstrate the performance of the derived tariffs
numerically using publicly available data from NYISO and
the largest utility company in New York City in Section IV.
Contingent on the deployment of enabling technologies and
smart meters, our results estimate that the optimal day-ahead
linear tariff could bring loses (4.8% of the utility’s revenue)
relative to the utility’s suboptimal two-part flat tariff due to the
lack of a connection charge. The optimal day-ahead two-part
tariff, on the other hand, could bring significant gains (8.1% of
the utility’s revenue). From a societal perspective, these loses
and gains manifest themselves as reductions and increments in
electricity consumption, respectively. These estimates assume
a realistic own-price elasticity of demand and a stylized model
for TCL. Some concluding remarks and proofs are included
in Section V and the Appendix, respectively.
C. Notations
We use x = E[x] to denote the expectation of a random
vector x ∈ Rn and Σx,y = Cov(x, y) ∈ Rn×m to denote
the cross-covariance matrix of two random vectors x ∈ Rn,
y ∈ Rm. Let also xk denote the kth entry of a vector x ∈ Rn
and x> its transpose.
II. MODEL
Given our focus on the retail electricity market, we assume
the state of the wholesale market is represented by an exoge-
nous discrete-time random process λk ∈ R+, which represents
the wholesale RTP of electricity at time k in a single location
of interest. We assume that the time periods k = 1, . . . , N
partition a billing cycle, which is the time horizon relevant
for our formulation. Moreover, we assume the wholesale RTP
accurately reflects the social marginal cost of electricity [7].
A. A Retail Tariff Model
In this paper, we consider time-differentiated retail elec-
tricity tariffs that are set and announced in advance (i.e., ex-
ante) by a regulated retailer with a fixed lag time. These
3tariffs (i) are fixed before the beginning of a billing period
of certain length (e.g., a month or a day) with a fixed lag time
(e.g., several days or hours), (ii) specify a pricing rule that
depends on the temporal consumption profile within the billing
period rather than on the accumulated consumption, and (iii)
are allowed to vary dynamically from one billing period to the
next. In the context of retail tariffs, the tariff lag time induces
a tradeoff between advanced price notification and price signal
accuracy [11]. The tariff model considered here captures both
the traditional long term flat tariff that has months or years
of lag time as well as more sophisticated dynamic tariffs such
as those with days or hours of advanced notification, but it
generally excludes ex-post tariffs such as those indexed to the
wholesale RTP.
Formally, some time before the billing cycle starts, the
retailer announces a tariff T : RN → R that maps the
metered consumption power profile q ∈ RN of each customer
to a scalar charge T (q) ∈ R. While the kth entry of q is
a single customer’s metered consumption in period k of the
billing period, the amount T (q) (in dollars) represents the total
bill. Note that this form of tariff captures the intertemporal
dependencies of pricing and consumption within each billing
cycle (but not between several billing cycles).
Given a tariff T , customers rationally choose in real-time
how much electricity to purchase from the retailer during each
consumption period of the current billing cycle. The retailer
then pays for the aggregate demand at the wholesale RTP.
Although in practice retailers buy certain portions of the
aggregate demand in forward markets (including the day-ahead
market), we can neglect such purchases in our formulation
without loss of generality for the following reason. In perfectly
competitive and well-functioning two-settlement markets, for-
ward transactions are essentially used to hedge against the
volatility of the RTP. Here, we consider risk-neutral decision
markers that deal with uncertainty by taking expectations.
Thus, in our setting, forward markets would bring no signifi-
cant advantages to any stakeholder. This justifies the reliance
of the retailer in the RTP to purchase electricity, which is an
assumption that simplifies our exposition considerably.
B. Consumer Model
We consider M customers (indexed by i) who obtain a
monetary benefit (i.e., gross surplus) Si(qi, ωi) ∈ R from con-
suming a power profile qi ∈ RN throughout the billing cycle.
This benefit is contingent on ωi = (ωi1, . . . , ω
i
N ) ∈ RN , where
{ωik}Nk=1 is an exogenous random process that represents
customer i’s local state. We assume that Si is continuously
differentiable in (qi, ωi).
Accordingly, customer i exhibits a consumption profile
qi = qi(T, ωi) when facing a tariff T and a sequence of
local states {ωik}Nk=1. Customers are rational in that sense
that the sequence of consumptions {qik(T, (ω1, . . . , ωk))}Nk=1
solves the multistage stochastic program
csi(T ) = max
qi(·)
E[Si(qi(ωi), ωi)− T (qi(ωi))], (1)
where the expectation is taken over ωi, and csi(T ) represents
customer i’s expected surplus. Correspondingly, a tariff T
yields an (aggregate) expected consumer surplus
cs(T ) = E
[∑M
i=1S
i(qi(T, ωi), ωi)− T (qi(T, ωi))
]
, (2)
where the expectation is taken over ω = (ω1, . . . , ωM ).
Of particular interest is the demand response to tariffs T
with constant gradient ∇T = pi ∈ RN , where pi ∈ RN is a
time-varying per-unit price, such as the tariff with the affine
form T (qi) = A+pi>qi. For such tariffs T we use the notation
Di(pi, ωi) = qi(T, ωi) (3)
for customer i’s demand profile, thus implicitly assuming that
it depends on T only through pi. Hence, Di is a standard
demand function which we assume to be nonnegative and
continuously differentiable in pi, and its Jacobian ∇piDi ∈
RN×N , with (k, t) entry ∂Dik/∂pit, negative definite. Under
the regularity assumptions made on Si and Di, one can show
that csi(T ) is decreasing and convex in pi (see Prop. 3 in
Appendix). We further define the aggregate demand function
as D(pi, ω) :=
∑M
i=1D
i(pi, ωi). A consumer model similar to
the one decribed in this section for N = 1 is proposed and
discussed with more detail in [14].
For example, for a linear tariff T (qi) = pi>qi, the consump-
tion of a TCL may be modeled with a linear demand function
Di(pi, ωi) = ωi−Gipi, with deterministic and positive definite
Gi ∈ RN×N . Such demand function can be derived from an
additive and temporally-separable quadratic benefit function
Si via stochastic dynamic programming [26].
C. Retailer Model
We consider the case of a retail monopoly and refer to
the single entity as the retailer, utility, or load-serving en-
tity (LSE). In procuring an aggregate demand profile q =∑M
i=1 q
i ∈ RN , we assume that the retailer incurs a variable
cost λ>q, where λ = (λ1, . . . , λN )> ∈ RN is the wholesale
RTP3 Hence, a tariff T yields the expected retailer surplus
rs(T ) = E
[∑M
i=1T (q
i(T, ωi)) − λ>qi(T, ωi)
]
, (4)
where the expectation is taken over the global state ξ = (λ, ω).
For notational convenience, we define the RS collected from
the volumetric charge pi of an affine tariff T (q) = A + pi>q
as φ(pi) = (pi−λ)>D(pi, ω) so that rs(T ) = φ(pi) +MA and
φ(pi) = (pi − λ)>E[D(pi, ω)]− Tr(Cov(λ,D(pi, ω))). (5)
III. RETAIL TARIFF DESIGN
In our retail tariff design framework, we assume that the reg-
ulator mandates the retailer to choose a tariff T that maximizes
the expected consumer surplus. Moreover, in order to recover
the upstream fixed costs incurred to deliver electricity, the tariff
should satisfy the revenue adequacy constraint rs(T ) = F ,
where F is a target approved by the regulator.
Formally, the regulator’s problem can be stated as
max
T (·)
cs(T ) s.t. rs(T ) = F. (6)
3While in practice the time granularity of the wholesale RTP is finer than
that of retail rates, we assume they are equal to simplify our exposition.
4In general, this problem falls in the category of Ramsey-
Boiteux pricing and peak-load pricing in economics [28],
which are main components of the theory of public utility
pricing [3, Sec. 4.5]. See [6] for a recent overview of this
problem in the context of electricity pricing.
In this section, we study linear and two-part tariffs—two
of the most widely used tariffs in electricity industry. The
restriction to two-part tariff can in fact be made without loss of
generality under certain conditions (Theorem 3). We begin by
making the following assumption that guarantees the existence
and uniqueness of solutions to problem (6).
Assumption 1. g(pi) = E[∇piD(pi, ω)(pi−λ)] is such that the
Jacobian matrix ∇g(pi) is negative definite (nd).
This assumption—made mainly for analytical convenience—
is common is economics [14] and essentially imposes a lim-
itation on the curvature of the demand function4. Intuitively,
the demand can be generally linear, concave, or convex in
pi; however, when convex, restrictions on the “amount” of
convexity are required for Assumption 1 to hold.
A. Structure of Optimal Two-Part Tariff
By restricting the regulator’s problem to two-part tariffs of
the form T (q) = A + pi>q, problem (6) can be reformulated
as a convex program under Assumption 1. We emphasize here
that our analysis implicitly assumes that no customer chooses
to avoid the connection charge by not consuming electricity at
all5. The following result characterizes the optimal solution.
Theorem 1. (Optimal two-part tariff) The two-part tariff T ∗
that solves problem (6) is characterized by
pi∗ = λ+ E[∇piD(pi∗, ω)]−1E[∇piD(pi∗, ω)(λ− λ)], (7)
A∗ = 1M
(
F − φ(pi∗)) . (8)
Theorem 1 implies that the optimal price pi∗ is characterized
by a period-specific price markup relative to the expected RTP,
λ. Examination of (7) reveals that this markup is essentially
determined by the cross-covariance between the price sensitiv-
ity of demand and the RTP6 To gain intuition into (7), consider
a demand independent across time7, case in which
pi∗k = λk + εkk(pi
∗)−1Cov (εkk(pi∗), λk) , (9)
for each k = 1, . . . , N , where we use
εkt(pi) =
∂Dk(pi, ω)/∂pit
E[Dk(pi, ω)]/pit
(10)
4In particular, for a linear demand D(pi, ω) = b(ω)−G(ω)pi, ∇g(pi) =
E[∇piD(pi, ω)] is nd since ∇piD(pi, ω) is nd. Moreover, for a demand with
additive disturbances D(pi, ω) = b(ω) + D(pi), A1 holds for pi ≥ λ if
each Dk(pi) is concave in pi since ∇g(pi) = ∇D(pi) +
∑N
k=1(pik −
λk)∇2Dk(pi). Concave demand functions are common in economic models
since they guarantee profit and welfare maximization problems to be well
defined [29]. See, for example, Prop. 4 in the Appendix.
5This assumption is widely accepted for services such as electricity and
water since “it is extremely unlikely that a customer will drop out of the
market, however high the tariff” [3, Sec. 4.5]. Studies suggest, however, that
more cost-effective DERs might challenge this assumption in future years [2].
6In expression (7), the second expectation is a second-order expectation
that can be thought as the cross-covariance between a matrix and a vector.
7That is, a demand with Dk(pi, ω) independent of pit for all t 6= k
to represent the (own or cross-time) price elasticity of demand
at time k with respect to the price at time t. The latter result
resembles the (second-best optimal) ex-ante two-part tariff
derived in [14, Sec. 3] for the single period case (N = 1)8.
The expression (8) for the optimal connection charge A∗
also has an intuitive interpretation. The first term corresponds
to a uniform contribution towards the retailer’s target F . And,
the second term corresponds to a uniform preallocation of the
surplus that the retailer expects to collect from the volumetric
charge pi∗, φ(pi∗), which—as noticeable from (5)—may be
positive or negative in general.
To gain additional insights into these results, we have the
following corollary.
Corollary 1. If ∇piD(pi, ω) and λ are uncorrelated, then
pi∗ = λ and A∗ = 1M
(
F + Tr(Cov(λ,D(λ, ω)))
)
.
Corollary 1 indicates that T ∗ has a very simple and ap-
pealing structure that resembles the result for the determin-
istic case where pi∗ = λ and A∗ = F/M . Note that the
assumption made in Corollary 1 is valid for many situations.
It is certainly true for demands that are not much affected by
consumers’ local randomness9, such as the charging of electric
vehicles and typical household appliances. Even for loads from
smart HVAC systems that are affected by random temperature
fluctuations, the assumption in Corollary 1 holds because the
demand function takes the form D(pi, ω) = ω +D(pi) [26].
As for the simpler structure of T ∗, it may not be surprising
since the efficiency of marginal cost pricing (i.e., pi∗ = λ) is
a classical result for the deterministic case [3, Sec. 4.5] [14].
Intuitively, marginal cost pricing is efficient because it induces
customers to increase consumption until the derived marginal
benefit matches the marginal cost of procuring electricity.
The expression for A∗ in Corollary 1 also has an intuitive
interpretation. While the first term remains unchanged from
(8), the second term becomes a risk premium associated to
the cross-correlation that the demand and the RTP may exhibit.
When such cross-correlation is positive (as in practice [30]),
the retailer is likely to face additional variable costs since
the expected variable cost E[λ>D(λ, ω)] is larger than the
variable revenue λ
>E[D(λ, ω)]. Intuitively, this fee represents
a uniform risk premium that customers pay to face a de-
terministic price rather than the volatile RTP. Presumably,
the inter-customer cross-subsidies arising from the uniform
allocation of this risk premium are negligible compared to
the differences. However, the integration of behind-the-meter
renewables could make these cross-subsidies worth adjusting,
for example, through the use of discriminatory connection
charges consistent with the cost-causation principle described
in [31]. A discussion on cross-subsidies is held in Part II [?].
8Which also applies to the continuous time case where k ∈ [0, 1], the
demand and prices are deterministic, and demand is independent across time.
9More precisely, this assumption is satisfied by demands whose sensitivity
to prices depends on the customers’ set of appliances and idiosyncratic
preferences rather than on random exogenous factors affecting the wholesale
prices, such as random temperature fluctuations.
5B. Structure of the Optimal Linear Tariff
A tariff of the form T (qi) = pi>qi—a linear tariff—is an
ex-ante two-part tariff with no connection charge. While such
purely volumetric tariff may be simpler, it has two funda-
mental disadvantages. First, a closed form expression of the
optimal linear tariff is not available under general assumptions.
Second, such restriction introduces a fundamental trade-off
between the retailer surplus target and the attainable social
welfare. These drawbacks are noticeable in Theorem 2 and
Corollary 3, respectively.
When restricted to linear tariffs, a unique solution to prob-
lem (6) can be obtained due to Assumption 1. We characterize
the optimal solution in the following result.
Theorem 2. (Optimal linear tariff) Consider the regime where
F is large, i.e., F ≥ φ(pi∗). If feasible, the linear tariff T † that
solves problem (6) is characterized by
pi† = pi∗ − γ−1γ E[∇piD(pi†, ω)]−1E[D(pi†, ω)], (11)
or, equivalently, by
N∑
t=1
−εkt(pi†)
(
pi†t − pi∗t
pi†t
)
= γ−1γ , ∀ k = 1, . . . , N, (12)
where γ, the Lagrange multiplier of (6), satisfies γ−1γ ∈ [0, 1]
and is such that rs(T †) = F . In this regime of F , the problem
is feasible if and only if F ≤ φ(piM), where piM is the price
that maximizes rs(T ) over pi, which matches pi† as γ →∞.
In Theorem 2, expression (11) reveals that the structure of
the optimal linear tariff is characterized by a period-specific
price markup relative to the price of the optimal two-part tariff
pi∗. The scalar γ−1γ ∈ [0, 1], often called the Ramsey number,
adjusts markups in all periods uniformly to the point where
the expected retailer surplus matches the target F . A closer
examination of (11), which can be rewritten as (12), shows
that the own and cross price elasticities of demand determine
altogether the markup for each period within the billing cycle.
To understand (12), it is informative to consider the
case where the demand is independent across time, namely,
εkt(·) = 0 for t 6= k. In this case, the product of the markup
(pi†k − pi∗k)/pi†k and the own-price elasticity −εkk(pi∗) remains
constant in time and equal to the Ramsey number. This means
that periods with inelastic demands get high markups and
periods with elastic demands get low markups. For this reason,
this pricing rule is known in economics as the inverse elasticity
rule [3, Sec. 3.3].
Even simpler is the single period case, also derived in [14,
Sec. 3]. Notably, when N = 1, the scalar price pi† can be
obtained directly from the constraint rs(T †) = F , and it must
be set so that it pays for the average total cost of the procured
electricity, i.e., pi† = (E[λ ·D(pi†, ω)] + F )/E[D(pi†, ω)].
A specialized application of this result was developed in
[26], where a model for TCLs under a day-ahead hourly
pricing scheme was considered. In this case, the demand
function for each consumer is linear and the surplus function is
quadratic [26]. The aggregated demand is therefore also linear.
The consumers as a collective have a quadratic aggregated
Fig. 1: Pareto fronts induced by optimal linear and two-part tariffs. The slope
∂rs(F )/∂cs(F ) = −η relates to γ ≥ 1 in (11) through η = 2
1+γ
.
surplus [26]. Specifically,
Di(pi, ωi) = ωi −Gipi, (13)
Si(Di(pi, ωi), ωi) = δi(ωi)− 12pi>Gipi. (14)
where Gi ∈ R24×24 is deterministic, positive definite (and
symmetric). Letting G =
∑M
i=1G
i and Ω =
∑M
i=1 ω
i and
applying Theorem 2 readily yields
pi† = λ+ ρ1+ρ (pi
o − λ), (15)
where pio = G−1Ω induces E[D(pio,Ω)] = 0 and ρ = γ−1γ
is the Ramsey number, which is set so that rs(T †) = F .
Intuitively, ρ varies within [0, 1] inducing prices that vary
between λ and the profit-maximizing price piM = 12 (pi
o + λ)
as F varies between φ(λ) and the maximum profit φ(piM).
C. Tariff Performance Comparison
We now discuss the performance of the derived tariffs in
terms of social welfare (expected total surplus) leveraging the
graphical representation provided in Fig. 1. Therein, a Pareto
front for each tariff illustrates the expected CS and SW induced
by the tariff for different RS targets F ∈ [φ(pi∗), φ(piM)]. On
one hand, Theorem 1 has the following implication.
Corollary 2. As a tariff parametrized by F , the two-part tariff
T ∗ induces an expected total surplus sw∗ that is independent
of F and cs(T ∗) = sw∗ − F .
In Corollary 2, sw∗ denotes the constant SW attained by the
price pi∗, where sw∗ = sw(T ∗) = cs(T ∗) + rs(T ∗). Implicit
in this result is that for any affine tariff one can check that
sw(T ) =
∑M
i=1E
[
Si(Di(pi, ωi), ωi)− λ>Di(pi, ωi)] (16)
depends on pi but not on A. Corollary 2 thus implies that under
the tariff T ∗, collecting additional revenue from customers
to cover larger fixed costs embedded in F reduces consumer
welfare but does not compromise social welfare. This “iso-
efficient” trade-off between retailer and consumer surplus is
illustrated in Fig. 1 with a linear Pareto front with negative
and unitary slope in the cs-rs plane. Intuitively, suboptimal
two-part tariffs10 can achieve any point in the cs-rs plane in
10As the ones currently used by most utilities in the U.S., due in part to
additional bill stability and alleged equity concerns imposed by regulators.
6the shaded area below the linear Pareto front in Fig. 1, but no
ex-ante two-part tariff can achieve points above this front.
Theorem 2, on the other hand, has a analogous implication.
Corollary 3. The quantities sw(T †) and cs(T †) induced by
T † as a tariff parametrized by F are decreasing and concave
in F ∈ [φ(pi∗), φ(piM)] with sw(T †) = sw∗ and cs(T †) =
sw∗ − F for F = φ(pi∗).
Corollary 3 reveals that, unlike the tariff T ∗, the optimal
linear tariff T † compromises not only consumer welfare but
also social welfare when collecting additional revenue from
customers is required to cover larger fixed costs embedded
in F . This trade-off is depicted in Fig. 1 with a decreasing
and concave Pareto front in the cs-rs plane that bends away
from the efficiency level sw∗ attained by the tariff T ∗ as
F increases from φ(pi∗) until it reaches φ(piM). As before,
suboptimal linear tariffs can achieve any point in the shaded
area below the curved Pareto front in Fig. 1, but no ex-ante
linear tariff can achieve points above this front.
From the previous analysis, it is clear that two-part tariffs
dominate linear tariffs in terms of expected consumer surplus
in the regime of practical relevance where F ≥ φ(pi∗). A
natural question to ask is whether two-part tariffs can be
dominated by more complex nonlinear ex-ante tariffs. We
now argue that, under certain sufficient condition, the two-
part tariff T ∗ is indeed optimal for the regulator’s problem (6)
among all ex-ante arbitrary tariffs. To establish such result it
suffices to show that T ∗ induces the same expected consumer
surplus that would be achieved by a social planner who
makes consumption decisions on behalf of customers with
the unconstrained objective of maximizing the expected total
surplus. This is because the social planner’s problem provides
a trivial upper bound to the regulator’s problem.
Because we are interested in comparing ex-ante tariffs only,
the social planner’s problem should incorporate such implicit
restriction. The restriction to ex-ante tariffs translates into a
restriction for the social planner to use only the information
observable by each customer i when choosing their consump-
tion, namely their local state ωi. Hence, the social planner’s
problem can be stated as
max
{qi(ωi)}Mi=1
sw = E
[∑M
i=1S
i(qi(ωi), ωi)− λ>qi(ωi)
]
, (17)
where the expectation is taken with respect to ξ = (λ, ω), and
qi(ωi) is causally contingent on (i.e., adapted to) the local
state ωi. Finally, under the assumption that each ωi and λ
are independent, we show that the optimal solution to (17)
is qi(ωi) = Di(pi∗, ωi), which matches the demand induced
by the optimal two-part tariff. This result and the implied
optimality of T ∗ are summarized in the following Theorem.
Theorem 3. If (A2) the wholesale RTP λ and the local
state ωi of each customer i = 1, . . . ,M are statistically
independent, then the two-part tariff T ∗ is an optimal solution
of (6) among all arbitrary tariffs with the same lag time.
Theorem 3 indicates that the restriction to two-part tariffs
may imply no loss of generality. This applies—less gener-
ally than Corollary 1—for demands that are not affected by
consumers’ local randomness11, such as washers and dryers,
computers, and the charging of electric vehicles. For all the
other cases, where the sufficient condition (A2) does not hold,
Theorem 3 sheds lights on the performance of the optimal
ex-ante two-part tariff T ∗. While it is clear that the ex-
ante restriction entails some efficiency loss when (A2) is not
satisfied12, it is not clear whether the restriction to two-part
tariffs does entail efficiency losses. In other words, is there a
necessary condition for T ∗ to be an optimal solution of (6)?
IV. NUMERICAL EXAMPLE
We now estimate the performance of the optimal linear
and two-part day-ahead tariffs in a practical setting. Using
publicly available data from ConEdison (New York City’s
largest utility) and NYISO for the 2015 Summer season, we
estimate the average daily gains in consumer surplus that both
tariffs would have brought relative to the utility’s default two-
part tariff with flat rate. Here we assume a linear demand
model (13)-(14) and day-ahead linear and two-part tariffs.
The utility’s monthly residential energy sales13 and an
estimated residential hourly load profile14 were used to obtain
2, 208 (92 days × 24 hr) aggregate hourly consumption data
points. We used these points as iid realizations {xj}92j=1 of the
random vector D(1piCE, ω) = ω−G1piCE ∈ R24, where piCE is
ConEdison’s flat rate15, to fit G and then to estimate ω. Due to
the its low-dimensional structure, fitting G can be reduced to
determining a scaling parameter after assuming certain own-
price elasticity of demand at piCE16
ε(piCE) =
∂E [D(1piCE, ω)>1] /∂piCE
E [D(1piCE, ω)>1] /piCE
=
1>G1
xˆ>1/piCE
,
where xˆ denotes the sample mean of {xj}. While here we as-
sume a value of ε(piCE) = −0.3, which is a reasonable estimate
of the short-term own-price elasticity of electricity demand
[33], a sensitivity analysis over ε(piCE) is presented in [34].
We further assumed a total of M = 2.2 million of residential
customers and used ConEdison’s default residential connection
charge, which amounts to ACE = 0.52 $/day, to roughly
estimate the utility’s average daily revenue from residential
customers as rev(T CE) = E[D(1piCE, ω)]>1piCE + MACE or
$7.19 million USD. As for the prices λ, we used the day-
ahead prices for NYC as iid realizations to estimate λ and
Σλ,ω with sample mean and covariance estimators.
11In other words, demands that, given a retail price vector pi, are indepen-
dent from random exogenous factors affecting the wholesale prices λ.
12This is because relaxing the ex-ante restriction enables the use of the
ex-post two-part tariff T (qi) = F/M + λ>qi which trivially achieves the
maximum social welfare a social planner could achieve (first-best).
13For June through August 2015, which can be found in the EIA-826
database at http://www.eia.gov/electricity/data/eia826/.
14For a residential building in NYC, available in the NREL OpenEI building
load database http://en.openei.org/datasets/files/961/pub/. The location/model
with ID 725033-TMY3-BASE was used.
15NYC’s residential default flat rate during Jun-Aug 2015 was piCE = 17.2
cents/kWh (47.7% of which correspond to supply charges and 53.3 to de-
livery charges). Available at http://www.coned.com/rates/supply charges.asp
and http://www.coned.com/documents/elecPSC10/SCs.pdf.
16This is facilitated by assuming a homogeneous thermal parameter αi
across customers, which implies some loss of customer heterogeneity. See
[26] for details of the model, where αi = 0.2 is used in a case study.
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Fig. 2: CS and RS gains induced by various tariffs parametrized by the RS target F assuming an intermediate own-price elasticity of ε(piCE) = −0.3.
We plot in Fig. 2a the Pareto fronts{
(∆cs(F ),∆rs(F ))
∣∣ F ∈ [φ(λ), φ(piM)]} (18)
induced by the optimal linear and two-part tariffs and three
other relevant tariffs that satisfy the revenue sufficiency con-
straint: an optimized linear flat tariff with rate piF(F ), an opti-
mized two-part tariff with fixed connection charge ACE and rate
pi†(F−ACEM), and an optimized two-part flat tariff with fixed
connection charge ACE and rate piCE +∆(F ). The latter can be
thought as ConEdison’s adjusted tariff. In (18), ∆cs(F ) and
∆rs(F ) denote the surplus gains (losses if negative) relative
to the corresponding surplus achieved by T CE. For instance,
for the optimal two-part tariff ∆cs(F ) = cs(T ∗)− cs(T CE).
Fig. 2a compares the tariffs’ performances in consumer sur-
plus gains for different retail surplus targets. At ConEdison’s
estimated net revenue level F = rs(T CE), which corresponds
to ∆rs(F ) = 0, significant performance differences can be
observed among the computed tariffs. These differences are
more evident in Fig. 2b, which magnifies Fig. 2a around
the origin. Due to its nonzero connection charge, ConEdi-
son’s tariff clearly outperforms the tariffs without connection
charges, but is outperformed by the other tariffs with connec-
tion charges, which are further optimized. It is particularly
interesting that switching to the optimal linear tariff would
bring loses in CS (−4.8% or −$345k USD/day). Namely, by
virtue of a connection charge, even a simple flat tariff can
outperform a fairly sophisticated day-ahead hourly volumetric
tariff. Moreover, fully optimizing ConEdison’s rate (but not
its connection charge) brings rather limited CS gains (1%
or $72k USD/day). However, switching to the optimal two-
part tariff would bring significant gains in CS (8.1% or $582k
USD/day). This corroborates how effective connection charges
can be at increasing the retailer surplus without sacrificing eco-
nomic efficiency. This optimal two-part tariff, which features a
connection charge of A∗ = 2.65 $/day or nearly 80 $/month,
induces bill reductions for customers 6.62% larger than the
average customer and bill increments for all other customers.
Clearly, such charges may be politically unacceptable for low-
income customers and may require cross-subsidized reduced
tariffs, which have been an industry standard [3, Sec. 7.4].
V. CONCLUSIONS
In this first part, we derive consumer-welfare-maximizing,
revenue adequate, and ex-ante linear and two-part dynamic
tariffs from the perspective of a regulated retailer. This initial
analysis is for the case without renewables or storage in the
distribution system. Our results generalize previous works by
deriving said tariffs for a stochastic and multi-period demand
model with intertemporal dependencies and a predetermined
lag time between the announcement of the tariff and the
beginning of the billing period. We established that if the
wholesale prices and each customer’s consumption are statis-
tically independent, then the optimal two-part tariff is optimal
among the class of arbitrary tariffs with the same lag time.
While the optimal two-part tariff mitigates inefficiencies
induced by the optimal linear tariff, inequity concerns incon-
sistent with cost causation arise from the structure of the con-
nection charge. These concerns may become significant with
the sparse adoption of behind-the-meter renewables. While
tariff design criteria beyond efficiency and revenue adequacy
are out of the scope of our work, it is worth mentioning that
allowing discriminatory connection charges can give flexibility
to the regulator to achieve different objectives (such as inter-
customer cost-causation equity) and provide effective long-
term signals (e.g., location within the distribution network and
investment in on-site generation) [31].
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APPENDIX
Proof of Theorem 1: Solving rs(T ) = F in (6) for A and
substituting in the objective cs(T ) yields the expression
sw(T ) =
M∑
i=1
E
[
Si(Di(pi, ωi), ωi)− λ>Di(pi, ωi)] .
Differentiating the objective sw(T ) over pi yields
∇pisw(T ) =
M∑
i=1
E
[∇piDi(pi, ωi) (∇qSi(Di(pi, ωi), ωi)− λ)]
= E [∇piD(pi, ω)(pi − λ)] (19)
where the second equality follows from Prop. 2 below. Now,
the assumption that each ∇piDi(pi, ωi) is negative definite im-
plies that E[∇piD(pi, ω)] is invertible. Hence, one can rewrite
the necessary first-order condition (FOC), which is obtained
from equating ∇pisw(T ) = 0, as (7). Given the expression (7)
for pi∗, (8) can be obtained by solving the equality constraint
rs(T ∗) = F for A∗. Lastly, these FOC are sufficient for the
optimality of (A∗, pi∗) since sw(T ) = cs(T )+rs(T ) is strictly
concave in pi according to Prop. 4. 
Proposition 1. For each k = 1, . . . , N , Di(·, ·) satisfies
E
[
∂Si(Di(pi, ωi), ωi)/∂qik
∣∣ ωi1, . . . , ωik] = pik (20)
where the conditional expectation is taken over ωi conditioned
on ωi1, . . . , ω
i
k.
Proof: (20) are FOCs of customer i’s multi-stage deci-
sion problem (1) of sequentially choosing qi1, . . . , q
i
k, . . . , q
i
N
contingent on the so-far observed local states ωi1, . . . , ω
i
k to
maximize his expected net utility or surplus, i.e.,
max
qi(·)
Eωi
[
Si
(
qi(ωi), ωi
)− T (qi(ωi))] (21)
given a tariff T (qi) = A+ pi>qi known in advance (ex-ante).
Hence, the optimal solution qi(·) = Di(pi, ·) of (21) must
satisfy these necessary optimality conditions.
Each of these stationarity (KKT) FOCs is obtained by
differentiating the objective in (21) with respect to qik and
equating the result to zero. To see that, note that for each
time k = 1, . . . , N one can use the law of total expectation
to rewrite the objective in terms of an expectation conditioned
on the information observed up to k, i.e.,
Eωi1,...,ωik
[
E
[
Si
(
qi(ωi), ωi
)− T (qi(ωi))∣∣ωi1, . . . , ωik]] .
The FOC in (20) follows since ∂T (qi(ωi))/∂qik = pik. 
Proposition 2. Di(·, ·) satisfies the equation
∂E[Si(Di(pi, ωi), ωi)]/∂pi = E
[∇piDi(pi, ωi)]pi (22)
9where the expectations are taken over ωi.
Proof: We establish this vectorial identity proving each
component separately. Assuming the differentiation and ex-
pectation operators can be exchanged, we apply the chain rule
to the k-th component of the left-hand-side of (22) yielding
the following sequence of equalities
∂E[Si(Di(pi, ωi), ωi)]
∂pik
= E
[
N∑
t=1
∂Si
∂qit
· ∂D
i
t
∂pik
]
=
N∑
t=1
E
[
E
[
∂Si
∂qit
· ∂D
i
t
∂pik
∣∣∣∣ωi1, . . . , ωit]]
=
N∑
t=1
E
[
E
[
∂Si
∂qit
∣∣∣∣ωi1, . . . , ωit] ∂Dit∂pik
]
= pi>E
[
∂Di
∂pik
]
,
where the second equality follows from the law of total
expectation, the third equality is due to the causality of
Di(pi, ωi), and the last equality is due to Prop. 1. The identity
(22) readily follows.
Proposition 3. For any affine tariff T (q) = A+ pi>q, cs(T )
is strictly convex and (componentwise) decreasing in pi.
Proof: Differentiating cs(T ) with respect to pi (using the
chain rule) and leveraging on the expression (22) from Prop.
2 one readily obtains ∇pics(T ) = −E[D(pi, ω)]. Because
Di(pi, ωi) is nonnegative, the expression above implies that
cs(T ) is componentwise decreasing pi. Moreover, we have
that
∇2pics(T ) = −E[∇piD(pi, ω)]. (23)
Recall that a function is strictly convex (over a convex domain)
if its Hessian is positive definite (over said domain). Hence,
the strict convexity of cs(T ) in pi readily follows from the
assumed negative definiteness of each matrix ∇piDi(pi, ω). 
Proposition 4. Consider an affine tariff T (q) = A + pi>q.
If Assumption 1 holds then rs(T ) and the weighted surplus
cs(T ) + γrs(T ) are strictly concave in pi for any γ ≥ 1.
Proof: First, we differentiate twice rs(T ) with respect to
pi. Using Prop. 2 and some algebra one obtains the Hessian
∇2pirs(T ) = E[∇piD(pi, ω)] +∇g(pi). (24)
Recall that a function is strictly concave (over a convex
domain) if its Hessian is negative definite (over said domain).
Hence, the assumed negative definiteness of ∇piDi(pi, ω) and
of ∇g(pi) (Assumption 1) readily imply the negative definite-
ness of ∇2pirs(T ) and thus the strict concavity of rs(T ) in pi.
It remains to show that ∇2pi(cs(T ) + γrs(T )) is negative
definite for γ ≥ 1. From (23) and (24) we have that
∇2pi(cs(T ) + γrs(T )) = (γ − 1)E[∇piD(pi, ω)] + γ∇g(pi).
Similar arguments yield the desired result since both terms on
the right hand side are negative definite for γ ≥ 1. 
Proof of Corollary 1: If ∇piD(pi, ω) and λ are uncorrelated,
then clearly E[∇piD(pi, ω)λ] = E[∇piD(pi, ω)]λ. It follows
that the expression for pi∗ in (7) reduces to pi∗ = λ. In turn,
the expression for φ(pi∗) in (8) reduces to φ(pi∗) = φ(λ) =
−Tr(Cov(λ,D(λ, ω))), thus readily simplifying (8) to
A∗ = 1M
(
F + Tr
(
Cov
(
λ,D
(
λ, ω
))))
. 
1) Proof of Corollary 2: Leveraging on (2) and (4), the
expected total surplus induced by the tariff T ∗ characterized
in Thm. 1 can be written as
sw∗ = sw(T ∗)
= cs(T ∗) + rs(T ∗)
=
M∑
i=1
E
[
Si(Di(pi∗, ωi), ωi)− λ>Di(pi∗, ωi)] .
Clearly, sw(T ) is a function of pi but not of F or A. It
remains to show that pi∗ does not depend on F . But the
FOC characterizing pi∗ is obtained by differentiating sw(T )
with respect to pi and equating it to zero. It follows that sw∗
does not on F . Moreover, since rs(T ∗) = F must hold at
optimality, it readily follows that
cs(T ∗) = sw(T ∗)− rs(T ∗) = sw∗ − F. 
2) Proof of Theorem 2: Consider the Lagrangian of prob-
lem (6)
L(pi, γ) = cs(T ) + γ(rs(T )− F ), (25)
where γ ∈ R is the multiplier of the equality constraint.
Differentiating L(pi, γ) over pi yields
∇piL = ∇pics(T ) + γ∇pirs(T )
= E[γ∇piD(pi, ω)(pi − λ) + (γ − 1)D(pi, ω)], (26)
where we use Prop. 2 to obtain the second equality. The
necessary FOC in (11) follows from equating (26) to zero after
some algebra. These operations use the negative definiteness
and thus invertibility of the matrix E[∇piD(pi, ω)] and the
expression for pi∗ in (7) (Thm. 1).
The expressions in (12) characterizing pi† componentwise
can be obtained from (11) after some algebraic manipulations
using the definition of price elasticity in (10). In particular,
subtracting pi∗ from both sides of (11) and left-multiplying by
E[∇piD(pi†, ω)] one obtains
E[∇piD(pi†, ω)](pi† − pi∗) = −γ−1γ E[D(pi†, ω)].
Componentwise, for each k = 1, . . . , N , we have
E[∇piDk(pi†, ω)]>(pi† − pi∗) = −γ−1γ E[Dk(pi†, ω)]∑N
t=1 E[∂Dk(pi†, ω)/∂pit](pi
†
t − pi∗t )
E[Dk(pi†, ω)]
= −γ − 1
γ
N∑
t=1
−εkt(pi†)
(
pi†t − pi∗t
pi†t
)
=
γ − 1
γ
.
As for the last statement of the theorem, consider that
maximizing rs(T ) (or equivalently φ(pi)) over pi yields the
related stationarity FOC
piM = pi∗ − E[∇piD(piM, ω)]−1E[D(piM, ω)]. (27)
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This condition, which is similar to (11), characterizes the
unregulated monopoly price piM. Indeed, (27) can be obtained
from (11) by replacing γ−1γ by 1, or equivalently, by letting
γ →∞ on both sides of (11).
Now, because piM maximizes φ(pi) and rs(T ) over pi ≥ 0,
there does not exist pi ≥ 0 such that rs(T ) > φ(piM). Hence,
when restricted to linear tariffs, problem (6) is infeasible for all
F > φ(piM). For all the other values of F within the considered
regime, i.e., F ∈ [φ(pi∗), φ(piM)], the fact that pi∗ and piM
achieve φ(pi∗) and φ(piM), respectively, and the concavity of
rs(T ) (Prop. 4) imply the feasibility of problem (6) over said
interval of F . Concluding, in the regime F ≥ φ(pi∗), problem
(6) over linear tariffs is feasible if F ≤ φ(piM) and unfeasible
otherwise.
3) Proof of Corollary 3: At optimality, we have that
rs(T †) = F and thus drs(T †)/dF = 1. The envelope
theorem further implies that the derivative of the value function
cs(T †) of problem (6) with respect to the parameter F can
be computed as dcs(T †)/dF = ∂L(pi†, γ)/∂F = −γ. The
total derivative of the expected total surplus with respect to
F is then dsw(T †)/dF = 1− γ. Hence, to show that cs(T †)
and sw(T †) are decreasing and concave functions of F over
F ∈ [φ(pi∗), φ(piM)], it suffices to show that γ, as a function of
F , satisfies γ ≥ 1 and dγ/dF ≥ 0 over F ∈ [φ(pi∗), φ(piM)].
Moreover, it is clear from the Lagreangian L(pi, γ) in (25)
that rs(T †) must be a decreasing function of the parameter
γ. Conversely, the constraint rs(T ) = F implies that rs(T †)
is a strictly increasing function of F . Hence, we have that γ
increases as F increases, and thus dγ/dF ≥ 0.
Finally, note that γ = 1 and pi† = pi∗ are optimal for
F = φ(pi∗) since they satisfy the FOC (11) and the constraint
rs(T †) = F . Recall also from Thm. 2 that the problem at hand
remains feasible if F ≤ φ(piM). Because dγ/dF ≥ 0, we can
conclude that γ ≥ 1 for F ∈ [φ(pi∗), φ(piM)], thus completing
the proof.
4) Proof of Theorem 3: We prove this result by showing
that the optimal two-part tariff T ∗ characterized by Theorem
1 attains an upper bound for the performance of all ex-ante
tariffs. This upper bound is the performance achieved by a
social planner who directly makes all decisions on behalf of
consumers. The social planner is unlike the regulator who
is limited to coordinate such decisions indirectly through a
tariff. To obtain a tight upper bound for ex-ante tariffs only
(rather than a looser bound for all possibly ex-post tariffs), the
social planner makes customers’ decisions relying only on the
information observable by each of them (i.e., ωi) as opposed
to based on global information (e.g., ξ = (λ, ω1, . . . , ωM )).
Consider the social planner’s problem in (17), which cor-
responds to the regulator’s problem (6) in the absence of any
DERs. Therein, the notation qi(ωi) indicates the restriction of
the social planner to make (causal) decisions contingent only
on the local state of each customer ωi. Recall from (1) that the
expected consumer surplus for a given ex-ante tariff is given
by cs(T ) =
∑M
i=1 cs
i(T ), where
csi(T ) = max
qi(·)
E
[
Si
(
qi(ωi), ωi
)− T (qi(ωi))]
= E
[
Si(qi(T, ωi), ωi)− T (qi(T, ωi))] ,
and the corresponding expected retailer surplus is given by
rs(T ) = E
[
M∑
i=1
T
(
qi(T, ωi)
)− λ>qi(T, ωi)] ,
and the expected total surplus by
sw(T ) = cs(T ) + rs(T )
= E
[
M∑
i=1
Si
(
qi(T, ωi), ωi
)− λ>qi(T, ωi)] .
The following sequence of equalities/inequalities shows that
problem (17) provides an upper bound to problem (6).
max
T (·)
{cs(T ) | rs(T ) = F}+ F
= max
T (·)
{cs(T ) + F | rs(T ) = F}
= max
T (·)
{cs(T ) + rs(T ) | rs(T ) = F}
= max
T (·)
{sw(T ) | rs(T ) = F}
≤ max
T (·)
sw(T ) (28)
≤ max
{qi(·)}Mi=1
E
[
M∑
i=1
Si(qi(ωi), ωi)− λ>qi(ωi)
]
(29)
= max
{qi(·)}Mi=1
sw. (30)
In particular, the inequality in (29) holds because sw(T )
depends on T only through qi(T, ωi). This implies that max-
imizing sw(T ) directly over {qi(·)}Mi=1 rather than indirectly
over T (·) is a relaxation of the optimization in (28). Clearly,
the problem in (29) corresponds to the social planner’s prob-
lem in (30) and (17).
It suffices to show now that T ∗ attains the upper bound in
(30). To that end, we use the independence sufficient condition
ω ⊥ λ. We show that, under said condition, the expected total
surplus sw(T ∗) matches the upper bound. First note that the
condition ω ⊥ λ allows to rewrite the upper bound in (29)
and (30) as follows.
max
{qi(·)}Mi=1
Eξ [sw]
=
M∑
i=1
max
qi(·)
Eωi
[
Si(qi(ωi), ωi)− E [λ>|ωi] qi(ωi)]
=
M∑
i=1
max
qi(·)
Eωi
[
Si(qi(ωi), ωi)− λ>qi(ωi)
]
=
M∑
i=1
Eωi
[
Si(Di(λ, ωi), ωi)− λ>Di(λ, ωi)
]
.
The last equality follows from the definition of the demand
function Di(pi, ωi) in (3) as the optimal response of customers
to deterministic prices.
The result follows since the tariff T ∗ induces the same
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expected total surplus if ω ⊥ λ, i.e.,
sw(T ∗) = Eξ
[ M∑
i=1
Si(Di(pi∗, ωi), ωi)− λ>Di(pi∗, ωi)
]
=
M∑
i=1
Eωi
[
Si(Di(λ, ωi), ωi)− λ>Di(λ, ωi)
]
. 
